Who, What, and Where: A Case for a Multifactor Balancing Test as a Solution to Abuse of Nationwide Injunctions by Matthew Erickson
Copyright  2018  by  Matthew Erickson Printed  in  U.S.A. 
 Vol.  113,  No.  2 
331 
Notes 
WHO, WHAT, AND WHERE: A CASE FOR A 
MULTIFACTOR BALANCING TEST                               




ABSTRACT—There has been a significant increase in the use of a 
controversial, dramatic remedy known as the nationwide injunction. This 
development is worrisome because it risks substantial harm to the judiciary 
by encouraging forum shopping, freezing the “percolation” of legal issues 
among the circuits, and undermining the comity between the federal courts. 
But a complete ban on nationwide injunctions is both impractical and 
undesirable. This Note proposes a solution to limit the abuse of nationwide 
injunctions without banning them outright. When fashioning remedies, 
courts should simplify the sheer number of relevant factors by focusing on 
three main meta-factors, or categories, that should be used as a balancing 
test: the identity of the parties before the court, the nature of the claim being 
litigated, and the effect the remedy would have on the courts where the claim 
is being litigated—“who,” “what,” and “where,” respectively. The balancing 
of these three meta-factors will enable district courts to weigh more clearly 
whether nationwide injunctions are proper and will also give appellate courts 
a framework for reviewing whether district courts have abused their 
discretion by issuing this type of relief. 
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INTRODUCTION 
President Trump caused quite a stir on Twitter on February 4th, 2017, 
when he called Judge James Robart a “so-called judge”1 for blocking his 
recently issued executive order2 that became known as the “travel ban.” The 
travel ban suspended admission of all refugees from Syria for 120 days, 
reduced the number of refugees admitted each year from 100,000 to 50,000, 
and called for more careful vetting of immigrants from majority-Muslim 
countries.3 The President’s statements about Judge Robart drew strong 
condemnation, even from within his own party.4 
 
 1 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976 [https://perma.cc/Y4MY-NEGC]. 
 2 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). 
 3 See Carol Morello, Trump Signs Order Temporarily Halting Admission of Refugees, Promises 
Priority for Christians, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/trump-approves-extreme-vetting-of-refugees-promises-priority-for-christians/2017/01/27/ 
007021a2-e4c7-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html [https://perma.cc/EBP9-VRSB]. 
 4 For example, even Justice Neil Gorsuch, then still Trump’s nominee for the Supreme Court, 
reportedly called Trump’s statements “disheartening.” See Ashley Killough, Supreme Court Nominee 
Gorsuch Calls Trump’s Tweets ‘Disheartening,’ CNN (Feb. 9, 2017 12:14 PM), 
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While the facts surrounding the travel ban and the President’s criticism 
of the judiciary received substantial attention, considerably less attention was 
given to what started the controversy—Judge Robart’s use of a “nationwide 
injunction,”5 which enjoined the federal government from enforcing the 
executive order anywhere in the United States.6 Judges did not use this type 
of remedy until the 1960s,7 and some courts still describe it as an 
“extraordinary remedy.”8 Nevertheless, nationwide injunctions are now 
widely used,9 with some courts even issuing them as a matter of course for 
certain types of cases.10 
The problem with this practice is that the unrestrained use of nationwide 
injunctions comes with substantial drawbacks. While nationwide injunctions 




 5 Nationwide injunctions are also sometimes called “universal injunctions,” which may be a more 
precise term because these broad remedies apply to all persons rather than to a geographic area. See 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (choosing to use the term 
“universal injunction” as it is more precise). However, for clarity’s sake this Note opts for the more 
commonly used term “nationwide injunction.” 
 6 Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), stay 
denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 7 See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
417, 428–45 (2017) (discussing the origin of nationwide injunctions). 
 8 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017) 
(“[I]ssuing a nationwide injunction should not be a default approach. It is an extraordinary remedy . . . .”). 
 9 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated, 
138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (upholding nationwide injunction against Executive Order 13,780); Earth Island 
Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding nationwide injunction invalidating 
Forest Service regulation); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1410 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (upholding nationwide injunction against Army Corps of Engineers’ rule); Washington v. 
Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103–04 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding nationwide injunction against the use of the 
prison commissary fund by the Bureau of Prisons); Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1168–72 (9th Cir. 
1987) (upholding nationwide injunction against an action by the Secretary of Labor); Wirtz v. Baldor 
Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 533–35 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (issuing nationwide injunction against Secretary of 
Labor’s determination under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 
2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (denying Attorney General’s request to stay nationwide injunction); Hawai’i v. 
Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1239 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting nationwide injunction against travel ban), 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 564–65 
(D. Md. 2017); Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (granting temporary restraining order and 
temporary nationwide injunction until court could hear issue), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 10 For instance, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes review of “final agency action” 
and is frequently involved in challenges to agency actions. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst., 490 F.3d at 699 
(holding the language “set aside” in the APA compels nationwide injunctions); see also 5 U.S.C. § 704 
(2012) (authorizing judicial review of “final agency action[s]” (emphasis omitted)). See generally JARED 
P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL 
AGENCY ACTION 1–2, 9 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44699.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJF4-AKYP] 
(“The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is perhaps the most prominent modern vehicle for challenging 
the actions of a federal agency.”). 
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from enforcing the policy in question anywhere in the country. This prevents 
other district courts from reviewing the issue, freezes the law in place, and 
inhibits circuit splits from developing.11 Nationwide injunctions also run 
counter to the principle of comity between federal courts and circumvent the 
rule that the federal government is free to litigate issues that it lost in other 
cases.12 Moreover, nationwide injunctions promote forum shopping and may 
even make class actions a waste of time because they provide for class-wide 
relief without the trouble and expense of class certification.13 
While judges have issued nationwide injunctions for decades,14 
scholars15 and courts16 have recently begun to give them more careful 
attention. Some courts realize that issuing a nationwide injunction requires 
justification,17 but the scope of an injunction is often dealt with briefly or not 
at all.18 This is understandable, because the Supreme Court has offered only 
clues as to the proper scope of an injunction and has never spoken directly 
on this issue.19 To solve this dilemma, some scholars have argued that 
nationwide injunctions should never be available,20 while many courts 
employ logic that would almost always make nationwide injunctions 
available.21 Others offer solutions somewhere in between.22 Who is right, and 
how can this problem be resolved? 
This Note takes a middle path by offering a more complete view of the 
scope of a court’s equitable powers, taking into account both the harms and 
 
 11 See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 69–78 and accompanying text. 
 13 See generally Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
487 (2016) (arguing that nationwide injunctions reduce the incentive for class actions). 
 14 See Bray, supra note 7, at 428. 
 15 See infra Part II. 
 16 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017) 
(discussing increased attention to nationwide injunctions). 
 17 See id. 
 18 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 
2017) (issuing a nationwide temporary restraining order discussing the propriety of a nationwide 
injunction in two sentences), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 19 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 500–01 (2009) (“We likewise do not reach 
the question whether, if respondents prevailed, a nationwide injunction would be appropriate.”). Justice 
Clarence Thomas also discussed nationwide injunctions in a concurrence. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. 
Ct. 2392, 2424–29 (2018); see also Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089–90 
(2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (objecting to the use of a nationwide 
injunction on the basis that the equities favored the government but taking no position on the propriety of 
nationwide injunctions in general). 
 20 See Bray, supra note 7, at 471.  
 21 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 
687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 22 See infra Sections II.A and II.C. 
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benefits of nationwide injunctions. Instead of eliminating the nationwide 
injunction23 or imposing a geographical limit,24 this Note advocates for a 
balancing test, which is rooted in the well-recognized practice of balancing 
the equities.25 A balancing test rooted in this doctrine therefore promises to 
rein in the use of this extraordinary26 remedy without sacrificing the 
discretion that judges have always had in fashioning equitable relief. 
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I compares the benefits and harms 
of nationwide injunctions and provides an overview of some of the most 
notable cases discussing the propriety of such injunctions. Part II then 
surveys the scholarship on this subject and argues that these proposed 
solutions are unsatisfactory or insufficient. Part III proposes a new 
framework for analyzing the many factors that courts and scholars have 
identified as relevant by boiling them down to three meta-factors or 
categories: (1) “Who,” the parties before the court; (2) “What,” the nature of 
the claim being litigated; and (3) “Where,” the effects the remedy will have 
on the judicial system where the claim is being litigated. Part IV argues that 
a balancing test using these meta-factors is the proper way to determine when 
nationwide injunctions should be used, even in difficult cases where the 
abuse of discretion standard cannot be met, and provides two examples of 
how this test should be applied. This Part also argues that even in difficult 
cases where the abuse of discretion standard cannot be met, a balancing test 
still usefully contributes to the common law method of judicial rulemaking 
by requiring judges to explain their reasoning. Finally, Part V considers and 
rejects the possible counterarguments that multifactor balancing tests are 
unworkable and violate the separation of powers; it ultimately concludes that 
this three-factor test is workable in practice and that balancing tests do not 
pose the same separation of powers concerns in the remedies context. 
I. BENEFITS AND HARMS OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS 
Part of what makes the debate over nationwide injunctions so complex 
is that there are powerful values on both sides of the debate, any of which 
could determine the outcome in a given case. This Part examines both the 
benefits and harms of nationwide injunctions, and in doing so concludes that, 
 
 23 See infra Section II.A. 
 24 See infra Section II.C. 
 25 See, e.g., Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“[C]ourts ‘must balance the competing claims 
of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested 
relief.’” (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987))). 
 26 See id. at 22 (discussing how preliminary injunctions are “an extraordinary remedy that may only 
be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief” (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 
520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam))). 
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despite their potential harm, nationwide injunctions may still be useful in 
certain situations. 
A. Benefits 
Judges and scholars have identified three primary benefits of 
nationwide injunctions: (1) the rule of law and uniformity, (2) egalitarian 
concerns, and (3) judicial economy or efficiency. 
First, the simple moral intuition that it is wrong to allow illegal—and 
even more importantly, unconstitutional—conduct to continue unchecked is 
perhaps the most compelling explanation for the proliferation of nationwide 
injunctions. While the widespread use of nationwide injunctions is a 
relatively new phenomenon,27 it follows logically from the concept of 
judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison,28 in which the Supreme 
Court firmly established that the courts have the power to strike down 
unconstitutional laws.29 It is only a small step from the concept of judicial 
review to the nationwide injunction—if it is the job of the courts to declare 
what the law is, any view that contradicts a judicial opinion is, in a sense, not 
the law. This is particularly true in constitutional matters because the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land,30 rendering all statutes that 
conflict with it moot.31 To allow an agency to continue enforcing a “moot” 
law arguably violates this basic principle.32 
The rule of law argument in favor of nationwide injunctions also 
justifies their increasingly widespread use. Because the federal government 
generally enacts policies and statutes uniformly around the country, if one of 
those policies or statutes is unconstitutional, the resulting harm is usually 
 
 27 Professor Samuel Bray identifies the 1960s as the beginning of the nationwide injunction. See 
Bray, supra note 7, at 437–44. 
 28 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”). 
 29 Scholars have noted that others endorsed judicial review even before Marbury. See Randy E. 
Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Judicial Power, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 115, 121–32 (2004) 
(arguing that Marbury did not invent judicial review and that various Founders endorsed the concept as 
an element of the judicial power in Article III). 
 30 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
 31 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (“It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in 
declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the 
laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, 
have that rank.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 32 Indeed, in City of Chicago v. Sessions, Judge Harry Leinenweber employed exactly this reasoning 
to justify the use of a nationwide injunction, notwithstanding growing concerns about their propriety. See 
No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017) (“The rule of law is undermined where 
a court holds that the Attorney General is likely engaging in legally unauthorized conduct, but 
nevertheless allows that conduct in other jurisdictions across the country.”). 
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nationwide as well. If the rule of law disallows enforcement against any 
similarly situated citizen, nationwide injunctions must become the norm.33 
Second, by protecting affected individuals not party to the litigation, 
nationwide injunctions can also promote equality. In fact, in Wirtz v. Baldor 
Electric Company, which appears to be the first case in which a court issued 
a nationwide injunction, the court justified the use of the injunction because 
it promoted equality before the law.34 These concerns about equality are 
exacerbated when similarly situated plaintiffs have different access to legal 
resources.35 Because equal treatment before the law is fundamental to a sense 
of justice and fairness, it may be important to protect nonparties in some 
instances by using nationwide injunctions. 
Lastly, nationwide injunctions can help preserve judicial resources. 
While a slower, more incremental approach may allow for the “percolation” 
of the best ideas on a particular subject,36 nationwide injunctions effectively 
decide the issue immediately for the entire nation, thus preventing 
duplicative litigation, which reduces courts’ dockets.37 Given widespread 
concern about the often exorbitant costs of litigation and the costs to society 
of funding the judicial system,38 it may be most beneficial to have some legal 
issues decided once and for all. 
B. Harms 
While nationwide injunctions do afford these benefits, they can also 
cause at least six distinct harms: (1) increased forum shopping, (2) 
 
 33 See Sam Bray, Finally, a Court Defends the National Injunction, WASH. POST: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/10/14/finally-a-court-defends-the-national-injunction [https://perma.cc/AR85-
6XZP] (“Once that proposition is accepted, the national injunction will have become the norm for all 
challenges to the validity of a federal statute, regulation, or order.”). 
 34 337 F.2d 518, 534−35 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“[Where] a lower court . . . has spoken, that court would 
ordinarily give the same relief to any individual who comes to it with an essentially similar cause of 
action . . . .”). The court in City of Chicago v. Sessions likewise endorsed this reasoning in deciding to 
issue a nationwide injunction. See 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (“All similarly-situated persons are entitled 
to similar outcomes under the law, and . . . an injunction that results in unequal treatment of litigants 
appears arbitrary.”). 
 35 See Kate Huddleston, Nationwide Injunctions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J.F. 242, 244 
(2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/nationwide-injunctions-venue-considerations 
[https://perma.cc/DME7-JVFN] (arguing that eliminating nationwide injunctions “might lead to . . . 
differential access to favorable judgments based on litigant resources”). 
 36 See infra Section I.B. 
 37 See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(granting nationwide injunction on the basis that a narrower injunction would lead to a “flood of 
duplicative litigation” and could overburden the D.C. Circuit). 
 38 See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 855 (2015) (“Because of 
fears that litigation is too costly, reduction of litigation expenses has been the touchstone of procedural 
reform for the past thirty years.”). 
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asymmetric issue preclusion, (3) increased chance and incidences of 
conflicting injunctions, (4) damage to the Supreme Court’s supervisory 
position, (5) a lack of remedial uniformity, and (6) conflict with precedent. 
First, because a nationwide injunction will be equally powerful no 
matter which court decides the case, broad injunctions encourage plaintiffs 
to seek out ideologically friendly judges.39 Forum shopping paired with a 
nationwide injunction can act as a type of veto in the hands of plaintiffs, 
creating a systematic disadvantage for the government. Furthermore, forum 
shopping may run the risk of painting the judiciary as just another tool for 
savvy political actors, endangering public perception of the judicial process 
as a whole.40 
This concern also crosses political boundaries. Most recently, members 
of the Trump Administration objected41 when judges issued nationwide 
 
 39 See Bray, supra note 7, at 459–60 (noting that high profile litigation against the Bush and Trump 
Administrations tended to be brought in the Ninth Circuit, while litigation against the Obama 
Administration was frequently brought in federal courts in Texas). For example, plaintiffs brought no 
fewer than six challenges to the Obama Administration’s policies in Texas, including challenges to the 
“Dear Colleague” letter from the Department of Education and an antidiscrimination provision of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). See Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 695 (N.D. Tex. 
2016) (issuing nationwide injunction against antidiscrimination provision of the ACA); Nevada v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 531, 533–34 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (issuing nationwide injunction against 
Department of Labor regulation that would have made an estimated 4.2 million workers eligible for 
overtime pay); Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425, 2016 WL 
8188655, at *15 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016) (issuing injunction against Department of Labor guidance and 
presidential Executive Order, which required federal contractors to report labor violations); Texas v. 
United States, No. 7:16-cv-00054-O, 2016 WL 7852331, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2016) (issuing 
nationwide injunction against Department of Labor’s “Dear Colleague Letter”); Nat’1 Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016) (issuing 
nationwide injunction against the Department of Labor’s “persuader rule”); Texas v. United States, 86 F. 
Supp. 3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (lawsuit opposing the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and 
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided 
Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.). 
 40 See, e.g., Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV. L. REV. 
BLOG (Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-the-nationwide-injunction-
problem [https://perma.cc/RWE8-CNJD] (“Most troubling, the forum shopping this remedy incentivizes 
on issues of substantial public importance feeds the growing perception that the courts are politicized.”). 
 41 See Kyle Balluck & Rebecca Savransky, Trump Slams District Court over Travel Ban, Sanctuary 
Cities Rulings, THE HILL (Apr. 26, 2017, 6:59 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/330589-
trump-slams-district-court-over-travel-ban-sanctuary-cities-rulings [https://perma.cc/ZLT5-XVSH] 
(discussing Trump’s criticism of the Ninth Circuit); see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), 
TWITTER (Apr. 26, 2017, 3:38 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/857182179469774848 
[https://perma.cc/6ZL6-TT29] (stating that it was no coincidence travel ban and sanctuary cities cases 
were brought in “the Ninth Circuit . . . . They used to call this ‘judge shopping!’”). Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions has also criticized judges issuing nationwide injunctions as “super-legislators.” See Melissa 
Quinn, Jeff Sessions Slams Federal Judges for Issuing Nationwide Injunctions Hindering Trump’s 
Agenda, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 10, 2018, 10:47 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/jeff-
sessions-slams-federal-judges-for-issuing-nationwide-injunctions-hindering-trumps-agenda 
[https://perma.cc/Z2T6-66H3] (quoting Attorney General Sessions, “Today, in effect, single district court 
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injunctions against the Administration’s “Muslim ban.”42 Democrats have 
also had reasons to be concerned with forum shopping.43 Consider possibly 
the most obvious case of forum shopping, Texas v. United States,44 in which 
Texas and twenty-five other states sued the Obama Administration over its 
immigration program titled Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and 
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).45 Plaintiffs brought this case in the 
Southern District of Texas in the Brownsville division, a district with “only 
two active federal district judges.”46 One of those judges was Judge Andrew 
Hanen, a known conservative who had publicly criticized the Obama 
Administration’s immigration policies.47 Judge Hanen heard the case and 
ultimately issued a nationwide injunction.48 
Second, nationwide injunctions cause asymmetric issue preclusion. If a 
court rules in favor of the federal government and denies a nationwide 
injunction, only the parties to that suit are precluded from bringing another 
suit on the same subject.49 If, however, a court rules against the government 
and issues an injunction, the government is enjoined from enforcing that 
 
judges are going beyond proper adjudicative bounds and making themselves super-legislators for the 
entire United States”). 
 42 See Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1237, 1239 (D. Haw. 2017) (issuing an injunction 
against other parts of the travel ban); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 
565–66 (D. Md. 2017) (issuing an injunction against the revised version of the travel ban); Washington 
v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (issuing an injunction 
against the United States from enforcing President Trump’s Executive Order), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 
(9th Cir. 2017). 
 43 See, e.g., Costa, supra note 40 (Judge Costa, a Democrat and Obama appointee to the Fifth Circuit, 
criticizing nationwide injunctions on multiple grounds, including their tendency to politicize the courts 
and incentivize forum shopping). 
 44 86 F. Supp. 3d at 604. 
 45 DAPA granted deferred action status to millions of undocumented immigrants, provided that they 
were parents of children who were either American citizens or lawful permanent residents, allowing them 
to remain in the United States. Id.  
 46 See Andrew Kent, Nationwide Injunctions and the Lower Federal Courts, LAWFARE (Feb. 3, 2017, 
3:02 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/nationwide-injunctions-and-lower-federal-courts 
[https://perma.cc/F8JN-CC33]. 
 47 See id. (“Other rules and institutional features can sometimes make shopping for a particular judge 
possible. The DAPA litigation, for example, was filed by Texas in the Brownsville division of the 
Southern District of Texas, where there are only two active federal district judges, including one, Andrew 
Hanen, who was known to be very conservative and had previously publicly criticized Obama 
administration immigration policies. Hanen ended up getting the case . . . .”); see also Bray, supra note 
7, at 458–59 (noting that district courts in Texas stymied many of Obama’s policies). 
 48 See Kent, supra note 46. 
 49 A judgment can only be enforced against a named party because it is a violation of due process to 
enforce a judgment against a party who has not had an opportunity to be heard. See Postal Tel. Cable Co. 
v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918). 
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statute anywhere.50 This asymmetric issue preclusion could thus unfairly 
disadvantage the government, as illustrated by the litigation surrounding 
Trump’s travel ban. While an early challenge to the travel ban in the District 
of Massachusetts was unsuccessful,51 other district courts subsequently 
found that the Executive Order was unconstitutional and enjoined it 
nationwide, essentially rendering the government’s victory in Massachusetts 
meaningless.52 This result asymmetrically benefitted plaintiffs because the 
government could not enforce the Executive Order anywhere in the country, 
despite both losing and winning in the lower courts. Thus, even where 
defendants have won as many or even more cases than have their plaintiff 
counterparts, they can still in effect “lose” in the vast majority of circuits.53 
Third, nationwide injunctions increase friction between courts, which 
could result in significant consequences for the court system as a whole. 
Take, for instance, the Supreme Court’s equally divided affirmation of the 
Fifth Circuit’s nationwide injunction against DAPA in United States v. 
Texas,54 which left the Fifth Circuit’s decision intact. Many plaintiffs 
attempted to circumvent the Texas district court’s injunction by challenging 
its scope, and one district judge in New York even signaled his willingness 
to disregard the injunction entirely.55 Though there are now nine Justices on 
the Court, this case illustrated a possible worst-case scenario, in which two 
 
 50 Several scholars have noted this asymmetry. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 7, at 460 (“The opportunity 
for forum shopping is extended by the asymmetric effect of decisions upholding and invalidating a statute, 
regulation, or order.”); Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common 
Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2020–21 (2015) (“Quasi-individual actions 
give rise to troubling asymmetries. . . . This . . . potentially expos[es] [defendants] to serial relitigation.”); 
Morley, supra note 13, at 494 (“Defendant-Oriented Injunctions also raise fairness concerns due to 
asymmetric claim preclusion.”). 
 51 See Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 38 (D. Mass. 2017) (denying injunctive relief on 
the basis that plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of success on the merits). 
 52 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 
2017) (enjoining Trump’s injunction nationwide), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 53 This asymmetry can also exacerbate the potential for forum shopping, because even if the initial 
plaintiff does not forum shop and the statute is upheld, future plaintiffs need only find one ideologically 
aligned judge to defeat the statute in every other jurisdiction. In Professor Bray’s words, “Shop ’til the 
statute drops.” See Bray, supra note 7, at 460. 
 54 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (mem.). At the time, there were only eight 
Justices on the Court because Justice Antonin Scalia’s seat had not yet been filled. See Adam Liptak & 
Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/supreme-court-immigration-obama-dapa.html 
[https://perma.cc/KTG3-7L4C]; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 55 See Alan Feuer, Brooklyn Lawsuit Could Affect the Fate of Millions of Immigrants Nationwide, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/nyregion/brooklyn-lawsuit-could-
affect-the-fate-of-millions-of-immigrants-nationwide.html [https://perma.cc/FW7J-8EFT]. During the 
hearing, Judge Nicholas Garaufis stated, “I have absolutely no intention of simply marching behind in 
the parade that’s going on out there in Texas, if this person has rights here.” Id. 
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or more circuits issue conflicting decisions and the Supreme Court 
subsequently deadlocks on the constitutionality of the statute.56 This could 
leave a plaintiff in a bind, mandated by one judge to follow a statute but 
prohibited by another from doing the same.57 While conflict on this scale has 
not occurred recently,58 it is likely that more conflicts will occur as 
nationwide injunctions become more common. 
Fourth, nationwide injunctions undercut one widely hailed59 benefit of 
the circuit court system—what Judge Harold Leventhal famously called a 
“value in percolation among the circuits.”60 Under this account, the ability of 
multiple circuits to review novel issues of law and fashion different solutions 
provides distinct advantages. Percolation helps filter out the truly difficult 
cases that would benefit most from Supreme Court review and allows for 
more judges to lend their voices to the discussion, increasing the diversity of 
viewpoints presented and ensuring that both sides of an argument are 
presented in their most compelling form.61 
Nationwide injunctions undercut this feature of our system by 
preventing the judicial system from effectively screening out meritorious 
issues for the Supreme Court’s review. A nationwide injunction may 
increase or decrease the chance of certiorari being granted, but in either case, 
harm may occur. On the one hand, for most cases involving nationwide 
injunctions, the chances of certiorari being granted are likely decreased 
 
 56 See Bray, supra note 7, at 462–64. 
 57 Conflicts caused by inconsistent court orders are typically resolved when one court backs down, 
the circuit court reverses the decision, or one court decides to exclude from the injunction those circuits 
that have upheld the enjoined policy. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 710 F. 
Supp. 2d 916, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (narrowing the scope of an injunction against the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to avoid conflict with the District of Wyoming’s injunction but 
lamenting “the unfortunate appearance of a lack of judicial comity that has arisen in the wake of the 
Wyoming court’s decision and the awkward position in which the [USDA] finds itself”). However, 
conflicting injunctions are much more likely if judges issue broad injunctions. 
 58 Professor Bray points to the Erie Railroad legal battles in the nineteenth century, which involved 
conflicting injunctions between state judges, as an illustration of how dangerous these conflicts can be. 
See Bray, supra note 7, at 462. 
 59 See, e.g., Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 
131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 52 (2017) (“Or take percolation. There is a widely held belief that it is useful, 
which we share.”). 
 60 Harold Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 
881, 907 (1975). 
 61 In Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s words, “[W]hen frontier legal problems are presented, periods 
of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield a better 
informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 
(1995). 
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because no circuit split is able to develop, keeping the law from developing.62 
On the other hand, if the case is very high-profile, as was DAPA litigation, 
a nationwide injunction may have the opposite effect, prompting the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari as soon as possible to resolve the resulting 
crisis.63 In both cases, the “percolating” process fails, either by preventing 
potential circuit splits from developing and revealing important divisions, or 
by obliging the Court to take cases without having the benefit of insight from 
the lower courts’ thorough review. 
Fifth, the use of nationwide injunctions results in a lack of remedial 
uniformity among the courts. One of the most frequently articulated 
advantages of nationwide injunctions is that they promote uniformity;64 
however, this is often not the case. Contrast, for example, two quotes from 
the same circuit. In 2011, Judge Posner noted that “[w]hen the court believes 
the underlying right to be highly significant, it may write injunctive relief as 
broad as the right itself.”65 However, another Seventh Circuit decision—that 
Judge Posner himself signed onto—stated the exact opposite position: “A 
wrong done to [a] plaintiff in the past does not authorize prospective, class-
wide relief unless a class has been certified. Why else bother with class 
actions?”66 This confusion is not limited to the relationship between class 
actions and broad injunctive relief—courts are split on whether the 
Administrative Procedure Act calls for nationwide injunctions,67 and 
whether facial challenges are more deserving of nationwide injunctions.68 
Judges therefore have virtually complete discretion whether to issue an 
injunction and can cite authority supporting any decision about the scope of 
equitable relief. 
 
 62 See Getzel Berger, Note, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A Structural 
Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1087 n.99 (2017) (“[M]ost nationwide injunctions receive far less 
attention, and, therefore, likely have a lower chance of receiving certiorari absent a circuit split.”). 
 63 See Bray, supra note 7, at 422 (noting that the nationwide injunction might even force the Supreme 
Court to review a “major constitutional question on a motion for a stay. In that procedural posture, the 
Court would be reviewing lower court decisions reached in haste, and without the benefit of a record”). 
 64 See supra Section I.A. 
 65 Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 1 DAN 
B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4(6), at 113 (2d ed. 1993)). 
 66 McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 67 Compare Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding the language 
“set aside” in the APA compelled a nationwide injunction), with Va. Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 
263 F.3d 379, 394 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[n]othing in the language of the APA” compels 
nationwide injunctions). 
 68 Compare, e.g., Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (“A 
nationwide injunction is appropriate when a party brings a facial challenge to agency action.”), with L.A. 
Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to issue a nationwide 
injunction in spite of a successful facial challenge to a regulation). 
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Finally, nationwide injunctions conflict with other doctrine, namely the 
federal government’s exemption from nonmutual issue preclusion and 
intercircuit agency nonacquiescence. Under modern principles of issue 
preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel) a party cannot relitigate issues 
that it previously litigated and lost,69 even if the party asserting collateral 
estoppel was not a party to the original litigation.70 However, the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Mendoza made an exception to this rule for the 
federal government, so that the federal government is free to relitigate issues 
that it previously lost against other parties.71 The Court noted that to do 
otherwise would “substantially thwart the development of important 
questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular 
legal issue.”72 
Nationwide injunctions attempt to bypass Mendoza by effectively 
preventing the federal government from relitigating issues in other courts, 
thus subjecting the federal government to a form of de facto claim 
preclusion. This poses the same harms to the judicial system that the Court 
noted in Mendoza: thwarting percolation among the circuits and putting 
pressure on the Supreme Court’s certiorari process.73 Even though Mendoza 
signaled the importance of the federal government’s discretion in relitigating 
previously decided issues,74 nationwide injunctions threaten to render 
Mendoza meaningless. 
Intercircuit agency nonacquiescence is a second doctrinal inconsistency 
with the use of nationwide injunctions. Under the doctrine of intercircuit 
nonacquiescence, an agency may decide to not be bound by a court’s 
 
 69 See, e.g., Brockman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1165−66 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(“The collateral estoppel doctrine prevents relitigation of issues which were involved actually and 
necessarily in a prior action between the same parties.” (quoting Kahrs v. Bd. of Trs. for Platte Cty. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1995))). 
 70 See Linda J. Soldo, Note, Parklane Hosiery: Offensive Use of Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel in 
Federal Courts, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 509, 509–10 (1980) (describing the abandonment of the requirement 
of mutuality and the difference between offensive and defensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel); 
see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (endorsing offensive nonmutual issue 
preclusion); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333–34 (1971) (endorsing 
defensive nonmutual issue preclusion). 
 71 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). 
 72 Id. at 160. 
 73 Getzel Berger insightfully recognized that both the benefits and harms of nonmutual issue 
preclusion against the federal government mirror those of nationwide injunctions. See Berger, supra note 
62, at 1096 (“The systemic policy considerations weighed in Mendoza mirror the key policy 
considerations on nationwide injunctions. The Court’s analysis framed the issue as pitting uniformity and 
efficiency against percolation and intercircuit dialogue.”). 
 74 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160. 
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decision in other jurisdictions.75 While the Supreme Court has never 
specifically endorsed any form of agency nonacquiescence, intercircuit 
nonacquiescence has been widely accepted,76 as it flows logically from 
Mendoza and the rule against intercircuit stare decisis: If courts of appeals’ 
decisions are only precedential within their respective circuits, and if the 
federal government should be free to relitigate issues in multiple circuits, 
then federal agencies should not be bound by a judicial decision nationwide 
until the Supreme Court resolves the issue.77 However, just as nationwide 
injunctions attempt to circumvent Mendoza, they also effectively nullify 
agency nonacquiescence.78 By enjoining agencies from enforcing policies 
anywhere in the country, nationwide injunctions essentially require agencies 
to acquiesce to the injunction-issuing district court in every jurisdiction. 
In sum, the debate over nationwide injunctions is complex, with a 
variety of arguments available to both sides. Therefore, any proposed 
solution must be sure to take into account both the benefits and disadvantages 
of nationwide injunctions. 
II. CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP ON NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS 
In recent years, a growing number of scholars have attempted to make 
sense of the benefits and harms of nationwide injunctions in different ways: 
Professor Samuel Bray argues that nationwide injunctions should never be 
available; Zayn Siddique defends the “complete relief” principle currently 
used by courts in a student note; Getzel Berger argues that injunctions should 
only reach the borders of a circuit; and Daniel Walker identifies nine factors 
courts should consider. This Note analyzes each of these positions in turn. 
 
 75 There are two forms of agency nonacquiescence: intercircuit and intracircuit nonacquiescence. See 
Kevin Haskins, Note, A Delicate Balance: How Agency Nonacquiescence and the EPA’s Water Transfer 
Rule Dilute the Clean Water Act After Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of 
New York, 60 ME. L. REV. 173, 175 (2008). Intracircuit nonacquiescence occurs when an agency decides 
to not be bound by a decision in the same jurisdiction that issued that decision. See Samuel Estreicher & 
Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 743 (1989). 
In contrast, intercircuit nonacquiescence occurs when an agency decides to not be bound in a different 
jurisdiction. See id. There is debate over whether intracircuit nonacquiescence is constitutional. See id. 
(arguing that intracircuit nonacquiescence should only be allowed in limited circumstances). 
 76 See, e.g., Indep. Petrol. Ass’n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(“[I]ntercircuit nonacquiescence is permissible, especially when the law is unsettled.”); see also Berger, 
supra note 62, at 1099 n.160 (compiling sources recognizing intercircuit nonacquiescence). 
 77 For a summary of the arguments for and against different forms of agency nonacquiescence, see 
Haskins, supra note 75, at 176–83. 
 78 See Berger, supra note 62, at 1099 (“Nationwide injunctions flatly prohibit intercircuit 
nonacquiescence.”). 
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A. Professor Bray’s Plaintiff-Limited Injunction Rule 
In his widely cited article, Professor Samuel Bray argues that, because 
the role of the courts is solely to do justice to the parties before the court, 
courts do not have the power to issue nationwide injunctions.79 In doing so, 
Professor Bray lays out three main arguments. First, there can be no support 
in equity for nationwide injunctions because there were no injunctions 
against the Crown in traditional courts of equity, as the chancellor spoke on 
behalf of the king.80 Second, because Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
gives the courts “judicial Power” that is limited to the power to do justice 
between the parties before the court, any equitable remedy that reaches 
beyond the named plaintiffs violates Article III.81 Lastly, limits on traditional 
equity were historically not necessary because there was only one chancellor 
in England, compared to what Professor Bray characterizes as the “multiple 
chancellors” system in the United States.82 
While Professor Bray’s plaintiff-limited injunction rule is clear and 
easy to apply, it is inadequate for multiple reasons. Though traditional 
principles of equity did not often allow for courts to reach nonparties,83 
equity constantly evolved to meet new issues of the day that the formalistic 
and static common law could not meet.84 The Supreme Court has made it 
clear that courts of equity today possess the same equitable powers that 
courts of equity exercised in England at this country’s founding, and 
therefore this discretion carries over.85 To make carefully formalistic 
 
 79 See Bray, supra note 7, at 418 (“A federal court should give what might be called a ‘plaintiff-
protective injunction,’ enjoining the defendant’s conduct only with respect to the plaintiff. No matter how 
important the question and no matter how important the value of uniformity, a federal court should not 
award a national injunction.”). 
 80 See id. at 425 (“In English equity before the Founding of the United States, there were no 
injunctions against the Crown. No doubt part of the explanation was the identification of the Chancellor 
with the King . . . .”). 
 81 See id. at 421 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
 82 See id. at 420. 
 83 Professor Bray himself acknowledges that this was not universally true, because the mechanism 
of a “bill of peace” allowed the chancellor to resolve multiple claims of a cohesive group all at once, a 
type of “proto-class action.” See id. at 426. 
 84 See, e.g., The Earl of Oxford’s Case in Chancery (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486, 1 Chan. Rep. 1, 
6–7 (“The Office of the Chancellor is . . . to soften and mollify the Extremity of the Law . . . .”). The idea 
that equity existed to soften the harsh consequences of the law dates all the way back to Aristotle. 
Paraphrasing Aristotle, Blackstone once wrote: “For, since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or 
expressed, it is necessary that, when the general decrees of the law come to be applied to particular cases, 
there should be somewhere a power vested of defining those circumstances . . . .” 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61. 
 85 See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (“The suits in equity of which the federal courts 
have had ‘cognizance’ ever since 1789 constituted the body of law which had been transplanted to this 
country from the English Court of Chancery.”). 
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arguments about the extent of a court’s equitable powers misunderstands the 
way that equity actually operated.86 
Even if Professor Bray were correct about the proper extent of the 
judiciary’s equitable powers, his proposition is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s view of the propriety of injunctions reaching beyond class 
members. In Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the practice of issuing injunctions that reach beyond 
named plaintiffs.87 While the Court narrowed the injunction against the travel 
ban to cover only those with a “credible claim of a bona fide relationship 
with a person or entity in the United States,” the Court still found that, after 
balancing the equities, some individuals who were not named plaintiffs 
should be subject to the injunction.88 In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Thomas made an argument similar to that of Professor Bray, but his dissent 
garnered only three votes.89 Therefore, until Professor Bray’s view gains 
favor among more Justices, those who wish to reduce the number and 
breadth of nationwide injunctions (as Professor Bray does) will have to argue 
within the equitable balancing framework the Court currently endorses. 
Professor Bray also freely acknowledges one of the most striking 
negative consequences of his proposal: plaintiff detection.90 The example he 
provides is a good one: fourteen plaintiffs challengedand won an 
injunction againsta California Highway Patrol policy of aggressive 
enforcement of a helmet law, which the court found violated the Fourth 
Amendment.91 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction against anyone, not 
 
 86 Along these lines, in his article, Professor Bray alludes to a possible counterargument. While 
England had only one chancellor, the Constitution shifted to a multiple-chancellor model of the federal 
courts, thus decreasing the equitable powers of the courts. See Bray, supra note 7, at 472–73. However, 
Professor Bray does not cite any sources contemporary with the ratification of the Constitution that 
support this view. It would be surprising indeed for the authors of the Constitution to change the powers 
of courts of equity without saying so in the Constitution itself. Moreover, Article III only requires the 
existence of one chancellor: the Supreme Court. The circuit court system was created by statute, not by 
the Constitution, and therefore does not affect the federal courts’ equitable powers. 
 87 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087–88 (2017). The Court affirmatively cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision to 
issue a broad injunction and cited a previous Supreme Court case which allowed Americans to challenge 
the exclusion of a speaker on First Amendment grounds, even though the speaker was not a plaintiff to 
the case. See id. (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763–65 (1972)). 
 88 See id. at 2088. 
 89 See id. at 2089–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In a more recent case, Justice Thomas wrote separately 
to voice his concerns about nationwide injunctions, but no other Justice joined him. See Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am skeptical that district courts have the 
authority to enter universal injunctions. These injunctions . . . appear to be inconsistent with longstanding 
limits on equitable relief and the power of Article III courts.”). 
 90 See Bray, supra note 7, at 478–81. 
 91 Id. at 478; see also Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1502 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
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just the named plaintiffs, reasoning that it would be incredibly impractical 
for officers to determine whether a given motorcyclist was one of the 
fourteen named plaintiffs who had won the injunction against the State.92 
Professor Bray responds to this problem by stating that this does not actually 
matter, because the burden is on the State to find a way to comply with the 
injunction and the State could embrace a more “creative option, such as 
distributing decals to the [plaintiffs]” to assist officers with identification.93 
However, this “creative” option borders on the absurd, and judges are 
generally reluctant to sanction law enforcement agencies.94 The simpler, 
more efficient solution therefore is to enter the injunction vis-à-vis everyone. 
Beyond plaintiff-detection issues, there are cases in which the rights of 
named plaintiffs are bound up with the rights of similarly situated nonparties. 
Take, for example, civil rights cases such as school desegregation. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that injunctions against governmental entities changed 
while these cases were being decided,95 because entire groups of African-
American citizens felt the harm from segregation and discrimination. As a 
result, the Supreme Court affirmed complex and far-reaching remedies, 
including desegregating entire school districts and setting up busing—a 
complex remedial scheme that reached beyond named plaintiffs.96 
“Complete relief” could not really be had for a plaintiff if they were the only 
person of their race admitted into a school, as their interest in equal 
protection was bound up with the rights of others. 
In conclusion, due to its inconsistency with the history of equity, its 
rejection by the Supreme Court, its potential for absurd results, and the 
possibility that wide swaths of the population will be left vulnerable, the 
plaintiff-only rule cannot be the answer. 
 
 92 Easyriders, 92 F.3d at 1502 (“[Because] it is unlikely that law enforcement officials . . . would 
inquire before citation into whether a motorcyclist was among the named plaintiffs or a member of 
Easyriders, the plaintiffs would not receive the complete relief to which they are entitled without 
statewide application of the injunction.”). 
 93 See Bray, supra note 7, at 479. 
 94 See Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-Class 
Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1148 (2005) (“The courts tend to show a high degree of 
deference to law enforcement agencies, and this deference seems to influence the courts’ decisions to 
narrow the scope of injunctions . . . .”). 
 95 See Bray, supra note 7, at 454 (“Yet another change that might have influenced the development 
of the national injunction was the desegregation cases of the 1950s and 1960s.”). 
 96 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (“The judgments below . . . are accordingly 
reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders 
and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a 
racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”); see also Walker, 
supra note 94, at 1132 (“The extraordinary nature of [school desegregation] required the courts[] to 
stretch their injunctive powers well beyond their historical limits.”). 
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B. Siddique’s “Complete Relief” Principle 
In his note, Zayn Siddique proposes the use of the “complete relief” 
principle, which states that the scope of an injunction should be “no more 
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the 
plaintiffs.”97 This test more or less restates the current approach98 and has 
already been adopted by the Supreme Court.99 The advantages to this 
approach are that it already has widespread support in the courts100 and 
weighs the interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant. 
Despite having already been adopted by the Court, this principle is 
insufficient for two reasons. First, despite its widespread acceptance by 
courts, it has thus far been ineffective in successfully constraining judges’ 
use of nationwide injunctions. As even many supporters of nationwide 
injunctions agree, nationwide injunctions are “strong medicine” and should 
be used less often than they are now.101 Therefore, something more than this 
rule is necessary to constrain their use. 
 
 97 Zayn Siddique, Note, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2103 (2017) (quoting 
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). 
 98 See Bray, supra note 7, at 466 (“The [approach] most commonly raised by courts and 
commentators is the principle of ‘complete relief’ . . . .”); see also Siddique, supra note 97, at 2105 n.54 
(explaining that the complete relief principle “is a reiteration of an equally well-established principle that 
‘the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy’” (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971))). 
 99 See, e.g., Califano, 442 U.S. at 702 (“[I]njunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the 
defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); see also Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (same) (quoting Califano, 442 U.S. at 702). While the Court 
in Califano attributed this test to the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
federal courts quickly adopted the test, and the Supreme Court later clarified that it was the law. See 
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2090 (2017). Based on a Westlaw search, 
Califano appears to be the origin of this particular wording of the test. 
 100 APA challenges to agency regulations are an exception where this principle is not consistently 
applied. Siddique and others have identified a split in courts, some of which hold that the APA allows for 
nationwide injunctions for all offending regulations, while other courts do not. See Siddique, supra note 
97, at 2100–01 nn.23–28. 
 101 For example, Judge Leinenweber cautioned that nationwide injunctions should be used rarely, 
even though he decided it was proper in the instant case. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 
5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017) (“Nevertheless, issuing a nationwide injunction 
should not be a default approach. It is an extraordinary remedy that should be limited by the nature of the 
constitutional violation and subject to prudent use by the courts.”). In affirming Judge Leinenweber’s 
decision, the Seventh Circuit also stated that nationwide injunctions should be rare. See City of Chicago 
v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 290 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Certainly, the ability to impose a nationwide injunction 
is a powerful remedy that should be employed with discretion. . . . Courts must be able to . . . engage in 
the ‘equitable balancing’ to determine the relief necessary. Rarely, that will include nationwide 
injunctions.”); see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 
131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 62 (2017) (conceding the potential harms of nationwide injunctions but 
concluding that she is “not ready to say that national injunctions that apply to nonparties are never 
appropriate”). 
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Second, the complete relief principle is often difficult to apply because 
it works both for and against the cause of reducing judicial discretion with 
nationwide injunctions, depending on which half of the rule is emphasized.102 
Judges who decide to issue an injunction can emphasize affording “complete 
relief” to plaintiffs, while those who decide that a nationwide injunction is 
inappropriate can emphasize fashioning remedies to be “no more 
burdensome to the defendant than necessary.”103 Therefore, this principle 
does not truly constrain the use of nationwide injunctions. 
C. Berger’s Circuit-Border Rule 
A third approach to nationwide injunctions created by Getzel Berger 
would geographically limit a nationwide injunction to the borders of the 
circuit in which the issuing court resides.104 Berger argues that this approach 
is preferable to Professor Bray’s, because even though injunctions 
sometimes need to be applied more broadly than against just the named 
parties, nationwide injunctions are nevertheless too extreme of a remedy and 
should not be used.105 Berger finds support for his proposal in two places: the 
congressional policy choice to divide the circuits into geographic units, and 
the policies underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Mendoza that the 
federal government is not subject to nonmutual issue preclusion.106 
First, Berger argues that the circuit court system demonstrates 
Congress’s intention to balance value for uniformity with percolation, and 
that his circuit-border rule respects this policy choice.107 Second, with respect 
to the Court’s holding in Mendoza, Berger argues that, because the Supreme 
Court noted the importance of the circuits’ ability to communicate with one 
 
 102 See Berger, supra note 62, at 1080 (“Many courts quote Yamasaki to support the issuance of 
narrow injunctions, emphasizing the ‘no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary’ part. Other 
courts, however, cite the same language in support of broad injunctions by focusing on the ‘complete 
relief’ part of the sentence to reason that broad injunctions are permitted if necessary to completely redress 
the plaintiff’s grievance.” (footnote omitted)). 
 103 See id.; Bray, supra note 7, at 444 (“When courts want to grant injunctions that go beyond 
protecting the plaintiffs, they point to . . . the need for complete relief. When courts want to grant 
injunctions that protect only the plaintiffs, they point to . . . the principle that equitable remedies should 
be no more burdensome than necessary.” (footnote omitted)); see also Va. Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. 
FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir. 2001) (“This injunction is broader than necessary to afford full relief to 
[the plaintiff].”); Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he 
plaintiffs would not receive the complete relief to which they are entitled without statewide application 
of the injunction.”); Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying 
nationwide injunction and noting that “[a]n injunction ‘should be no more burdensome to the defendant 
than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs’” (quoting Califano, 442 U.S. at 702)). 
 104 See Berger, supra note 62, at 1100–06. 
 105 See id. at 1100. 
 106 See id. at 1101; see also United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).  
 107 See Berger, supra note 62, at 1101. 
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another, precedent thus supports the circuit-border rule because the rule 
promotes the same value.108 
While Berger’s thesis is an admirable attempt to solve a complex 
problem, it has three notable shortcomings. First, his thesis purports to rest 
on the implied congressional intent to limit the reach of courts to the borders 
of their respective circuits. However, courts of equity have always been able 
to enjoin acts committed outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction.109 
Indeed, language in Califano specifically denies that equity is limited by 
geography.110 Given the long, unbroken history of equity acting in 
personam111 regardless of geographical lines, Congress would need to be far 
more explicit in order to geographically restrict courts’ authority in this way. 
Second, while the circuit borders are a useful way of breaking up the 
nation for injunctions or other jurisprudential purposes, the choice of where 
to draw the circuit lines is a policy choice that has no equitable “pedigree.” 
One could arguably use any other formulation of jurisdictional boundaries to 
which injunctions apply, such as the borders of the ninety-four district courts. 
This division would be no less arbitrary than the current circuit court 
divisions and would remain a policy choice made for pragmatic reasons, not 
equitable purposes. 
Third, in a few rare cases, the circuit-border rule could actually be more 
restrictive than Professor Bray’s proposal because some cases necessarily 
involve issues that cross circuit lines. For example, environmental litigation 
concerning Great Smoky Mountains National Park would, under Berger’s 
framework, have to be conducted in two parallel proceedings. The park is 
partially in both Tennessee and North Carolina, which are in the Sixth and 
 
 108 See id. (“The nature of the regional circuits features prominently in Mendoza, which focused on 
the ability of the regional courts of appeals to disagree with each other.”). 
 109 See Bray, supra note 7, at 422 n.19 (“On the other hand, to protect the plaintiff, equity was willing 
to enjoin acts committed outside of the Chancellor’s territorial jurisdiction. . . . Geographical lines are 
simply not the stopping point.”). 
 110 See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“Nor is a nationwide class inconsistent with 
principles of equity jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the 
violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.”). It could be argued, as Berger 
does, that the court in Califano was speaking about the propriety of injunctions in class actions, not equity 
in general. See Berger, supra note 62, at 1102–03. However, the context of the quote seems to be 
“principles of equity jurisprudence” in general, not Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically. 
 111 The phrase “equity acts in personam” is an ancient maxim of equity, which meant that (among 
other things) courts of equity could enforce their judgments in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Horace 
Stringfellow, Equity Acts in Personam, 2 ALA. LAW. 230, 230 (1941) (“[Because equity acts in 
personam,] courts of equity, having jurisdiction of the parties, are enabled to adjudicate and settle matters 
affecting property situated in other States and countries . . . .”). 
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Fourth Circuits, respectively.112 Under Professor Bray’s framework, courts 
would be free to issue injunctions that apply across circuit borders so long as 
they only apply to named parties and would therefore allow for broader 
injunctions in these cases. Requiring parallel federal litigation for a single 
issue simply because the problem in question occurs across circuit borders 
would be inefficient and is not required by law. 
In sum, while legal problems are often limited to small geographic areas 
and a court can tailor its injunction to the smallest geographical area possible, 
a firm rule against issuing any injunction outside of circuit borders is 
inconsistent with fundamental rules of equity and existing jurisprudence and 
is ultimately an arbitrary distinction. 
D. Walker’s Nine Factors 
In his note, Daniel Walker compiled a list of nine factors that he argues 
judges should evaluate when considering the proper scope of an injunction: 
(1) the type of parties; (2) whether the defendant is a government agency; (3) 
whether the challenge is facial or as applied; (4) the nature of the right; (5) 
the type of injunction sought (mandatory versus prohibitory and preliminary 
versus permanent); (6) the type of agency being enjoined; (7) restriction on 
venue statutes; (8) whether a narrower injunction would effectively result in 
legislating by the judiciary; and (9) the boundaries of the affected class.113 
While Walker addresses several important factors that courts consider, 
all nine factors can be consolidated into three main categories: Walker’s first, 
second, sixth, and ninth factors all concern the same basic question: the type 
of parties involved in the litigation; factors three and four both concern the 
nature of the claim being asserted; and factors seven and eight both concern 
judicial economy. This Note ultimately consolidates Walker’s nine elements 
into a three-factor test along these same lines.114 Further, this Note also adds 
to the list of factors,115 and makes a normative argument for why balancing 
tests are appropriate in the context of nationwide injunctions.116 
 
 112 See Great Smoky Mountains, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/grsm/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZF9Y-H29V]. 
 113 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1144–51. 
 114 See infra Section III.A. 
 115 The factors not present in Walker’s note that are discussed here include: federalism and abstention 
issues, the Mendoza precedent, plaintiff-detection issues, the asymmetric effects of res judicata from 
multiple litigation, comity and conflicting injunctions, the likelihood of forum shopping, and percolation. 
See infra Section III.A. 
 116 See infra Part V. 
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E. Other Approaches 
Various scholars have advanced other recommendations for 
constraining the nationwide injunction. Professor Michael Morley suggests 
that courts apply an equal protection and severability analysis before issuing 
a nationwide injunction, thereby requiring plaintiffs who are seeking broad 
remedies to seek certification as a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.117 Professor Maureen Carroll recommends a 
similar but softer approach: a set of changes to make class action lawsuits 
more appealing.118 Lastly, Professor Michelle Slack argues that courts should 
employ a presumption against class action certification where the 
government is a party to the lawsuit.119 While valid, this Note does not 
extensively discuss these perspectives because they are ultimately 
compatible with this Note’s proposed multifactor balancing test.120 
III. WHO, WHAT, AND WHERE: TRIANGULATING EQUITABLE REMEDIES 
Courts of equity possess the power and discretion to apply injunctions 
in novel ways to novel problems. This is a feature of, not a “bug” in, the 
system of equity. However, the system is not without drawbacks—namely 
the indeterminacy and inconsistency inherent in any system of standards and 
rules. This Note suggests that the solution to the indeterminacy and 
inconsistency of the equitable system is an obvious and time-tested one: 
equitable balancing. The concept of “balancing the equities” is hardly new, 
and courts already use it to determine when injunctions are proper.121 
Moreover, equitable balancing is consistent with equity’s history.122 
Balancing tests are beneficial because they prompt judges to adequately 
justify their choice of remedies, an important feature of the common law 
system. 
 
 117 See Morley, supra note 13, at 549−50. 
 118 See Carroll, supra note 50, at 2017, 2074–81 (proposing changes that include expedited timelines, 
reforming the “necessity” doctrine, and making class actions more financially attractive to attorneys). 
 119 See Michelle R. Slack, Separation of Powers and Second Opinions: Protecting the Government’s 
Role in Developing the Law by Limiting Nationwide Class Actions Against the Federal Government, 
31 REV. LITIG. 943, 987–95 (2012). 
 120 However, Professor Slack’s idea appears to conflict with Professor Morley’s and Professor 
Carroll’s ideas, because a court cannot logically encourage or require plaintiffs to certify as a class while 
simultaneously employing a presumption against certifying classes where the government is a defendant. 
 121 See, e.g., Breswick & Co. v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 912, 915 (1955) (“Where the question is 
whether an injunction should be granted the irreparable injury facing the plaintiff must be balanced 
against the competing equities before an injunction will issue.”). 
 122 As discussed above, equity has a long history of providing courts with discretion. See supra notes 
83–85 and accompanying text. 
113:331 (2018) Who, What, and Where 
353 
Ultimately, it seems inevitable that courts will have a great deal of 
discretion when fashioning equitable remedies, because discretion has been 
a feature of equity for centuries. Therefore, absent congressional attention, 
the best solution is a return to the roots of equity by engaging in a multifactor 
balancing test to determine if a nationwide injunction is an appropriate 
remedy.123 A system of multifactor balancing allows for that discretion while 
still imposing some necessary limits. 
The biggest roadblock to the use of a balancing test in the context of 
nationwide injunctions, however, is the sheer number of relevant factors. 
Unfortunately, previous scholars have not fully appreciated this problem, 
and a thorough examination shows that there are far too many factors to 
construct a simple balancing test. This Part proceeds by first examining these 
factors and then proposing a more workable three-factor balancing test. This 
proposed framework provides a means for evaluating and critiquing different 
cases. 
A. Relevant Factors 
While scholars have attempted to evaluate the factors that courts should 
consider when deciding whether to issue a nationwide injunction,124 any list 
will almost certainly be incomplete because it is impossible to consider, ex 
ante, every relevant factor. Nevertheless, this Section attempts to collect the 
most important factors that courts have, and should, consider when 
fashioning an injunctive remedy. 
1. Abstention 
Under the abstention doctrine of “Our Federalism,” federal courts 
should not enjoin an ongoing state prosecution out of concern for states’ 
interest in enforcing their laws.125 This theme of deference to state 
 
 123 This Note leaves to one side the discussion of whether balancing of the equities or tailoring the 
remedy is the more appropriate approach. While there may be some instances where Congress has clearly 
stated its intent about the proper scope of a remedy, see supra note 10 (comparing cases discussing 
whether the APA requires a nationwide injunction against illegal agency actions with constitutional 
remedies and many statutory schemes), Congress is largely silent on the issue of remedies and has not 
signaled a movement away from traditional principles of equity. For a comparison of balancing of the 
equities with tailoring the remedy, see David Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to 
Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 633−36 (1988). 
 124 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1144–51. 
 125 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44−45 (1971) (“[Our Federalism] represent[s] . . . a system 
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in 
which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and 
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate 
activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, ‘Our Federalism,’ born in the early 
struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its 
future.”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
354 
institutions is also present in the line of Tenth Amendment anti-
commandeering cases established by the Rehnquist Court, starting with New 
York v. United States126 and Printz v. United States.127 There are a number of 
other abstention doctrines, including Pullman,128 Colorado River,129 
Burford,130 and Rooker–Feldman131 abstention, which are similar in that they 
often consider issues of comity between the courts. However, unlike Tenth 
Amendment cases, these doctrines of abstention leave discretion to the judge 
applying them. While the details of injunctions will vary from doctrine to 
doctrine, the existence of a state as a party, especially as a defendant, may 
make the case more analogous to Tenth Amendment cases and, thus, may 
counsel toward a narrower injunction or even no injunction at all.132 
2. Intercircuit Nonacquiescence 
Following the Court’s holding in United States v. Mendoza,133 the 
presence of an agency as a defendant is a significant factor for judges in 
weighing whether to issue a nationwide injunction. As discussed in the 
previous Part, a nationwide injunction can effectively subject an agency to 
de facto issue preclusion and render intercircuit agency nonacquiescence 
moot.134 If the defendant (against whom an injunction is sought) is an agency, 
then this factor counsels toward applying a narrowing presumption to 
mitigate issue preclusion and preserve intercircuit nonacquiescence. 
3. Type of Agency 
The type of agency against which an injunction is sought can also affect 
whether a court will defer to that agency when balancing the equities and 
 
 126 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (invalidating a portion of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985 on the grounds that it violated principles of federalism by unfairly coercing 
states into taking title to radioactive waste). 
 127 521 U.S. 898, 933–35 (1997) (holding that provisions of the Brady Act violated principles of 
federalism by compelling state officers to enforce federal law). 
 128 See R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (holding that federal courts may stay 
a claim until a state’s supreme court has a chance to review the constitutionality of the act itself). 
 129 See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819–20 (1976) (holding 
that abstention is appropriate in certain circumstances where there is parallel litigation in the state and 
federal courts). 
 130 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317–18 (1943) (holding that a federal court may abstain 
from deciding complex issues of state law). 
 131 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (holding that federal courts are 
not to review state court decisions without direction from Congress); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 
413, 416 (1923) (holding that the federal courts are not, absent direction from Congress, to sit in review 
of state court decisions). 
 132 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1145 (discussing the first factor). 
 133 464 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1984). 
 134 See supra Section I.B. 
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choose not to issue an injunction in close cases.135 For instance, courts may 
be more likely to defer to law enforcement agencies than to other types of 
agencies.136 As with issues of comity, federalism, and separation of powers, 
courts try to avoid unduly hampering law enforcement’s ability to carry out 
its legal duties while simultaneously continuing to protect the rights of 
persons with whom law enforcement interacts. 
4. Substantive Area of Law and Scope of the Injury 
One of the most important factors courts consider is the substantive area 
of law giving rise to the claim.137 As noted above, civil rights cases likely 
require more complex and systemic remedies than, for example, breach of 
contract cases, even those involving the federal government.138 Likewise, a 
First Amendment case may be a candidate for broader injunctions because 
the harm experienced through a chilling of speech is diffuse and difficult to 
trace entirely to one particular plaintiff or group of plaintiffs.139 Professor 
Morley’s recommendation that courts conduct a type of severability analysis 
addresses exactly this consideration.140 Relatedly, some claims by their very 
nature require “indivisible relief,” where failing to enjoin related parties 
could subject defendants to incompatible standards of conduct.141 In contrast, 
if the harm to particular plaintiffs can be addressed by enjoining enforcement 
of only some parts of the statute, then a nationwide injunction overturning 
the entire statute is unnecessary. By examining how localized the harm is—
 
 135 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1148. 
 136 See id. (“[C]ourts tend to show a high degree of deference to law enforcement agencies, and this 
deference seems to influence the courts’ decisions to narrow the scope of injunctions that might otherwise 
be acceptable.”). For example, the Supreme Court has approved some restrictions on inmate behavior by 
prison administrators, such as limits on contact with the outside world, which would not be permissible 
in another context. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (“To ensure that courts 
afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to 
infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily 
applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.”). 
 137 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1146 (“The fourth consideration that courts should take into account 
is the nature of the right being vindicated.”). 
 138 See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 139 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1146. 
 140 See Morley, supra note 13, at 551 (“Generally, a court severs the invalid provision . . . unless: (i) 
the remaining sections cannot operate coherently as a law, or (ii) the court concludes that the entity that 
enacted the statute or regulation would not have intended for its remaining sections to be enforced without 
the invalidated portions.”). 
 141 Professor Martin Redish and William Katt explore the concept of indivisible relief in the context 
of the virtual representation debate. See Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, 
Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1879 (2009) (“The concept of indivisible relief refers to cases in which 
the relief sought by multiple parties from the same defendant demands that the defendant take singular 
action—in other words, that the defendant cannot, either legally or physically, provide wholly separate, 
disjointed, or inconsistent relief to the various plaintiffs.”). 
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geographical, statutory, or otherwise—courts have an indication of how 
broad the injunction may need to be to remedy the violation. 
5. Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges 
While some courts have arguably gone too far in treating the existence 
of a facial challenge as prima facie support for a nationwide injunction,142 the 
nature of the challenge is nonetheless important. An influential opinion in 
this regard is Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent in Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Federation,143 in which he stated that as-applied challenges generally justify 
narrow remedies, while facial challenges generally justify remedies that 
benefit nonparties.144 While broad remedies are not necessarily mandated in 
facial challenges, they are nevertheless an important factor to consider. 
6. Type of Injunction 
The type of injunction sought can materially affect the scope of that 
injunction. For example, mandatory injunctions compel the defendant to act, 
while prohibitory injunctions prohibit an action but leave the defendant 
otherwise free.145 The stage of the litigation is also important—for instance, 
judges issue temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions before 
parties have fully conducted discovery and argued their cases. Because the 
claim has not been fully litigated, courts should consider whether they can 
narrowly tailor the remedy.146 
7. Judicial Resources and Venue Considerations 
The conservation of judicial resources was an important consideration 
weighing in favor of an injunction in National Mining Association v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers,147 a case involving the propriety of class-
wide relief in the absence of a class action lawsuit.148 While the court in 
National Mining Association did argue that the APA mandated broad 
 
 142 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
13, 2017) (justifying a nationwide injunction because “[t]his case . . . implicates a facial challenge to a 
federal statute; the Attorney General’s authority to impose Byrne JAG conditions on the City will not 
differ from his authority to do so elsewhere”); see also supra notes 20, 51 and accompanying text. 
 143 497 U.S. 871, 900 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 144 See id. at 913 (stating that “[i]n some cases the ‘agency action’ will consist of a rule of broad 
applicability; and if the plaintiff prevails,” the plaintiff “may obtain ‘programmatic’ relief that affects the 
rights of parties not before the court.”). The Seventh Circuit also endorsed this dichotomy as a method of 
limiting use of nationwide injunctions. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 291 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(“A narrow question of law such as is present here is more likely to lend itself to broader injunctive 
relief . . . . Accordingly, this does not present the situation in which the courts will benefit from allowing 
the issue to percolate through additional courts . . . .”). 
 145 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1147–48. 
 146 See id. 
 147 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 148 Id. at 1409–10. 
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injunctions, it also noted its concern that a plaintiff-focused injunction would 
merely “generate a flood of duplicative litigation,” costing both the parties 
and the courts valuable resources.149 The fact that the parties conducted much 
of this “duplicative litigation” in the D.C. Circuit also factored into the 
court’s prediction.150 The pressures each circuit faces are different, and the 
potential for duplicative litigation is unique to each case, so articulating an 
abstract principle is difficult; however, the conservation of judicial resources 
may sometimes weigh toward issuing a broad injunction. 
8. Affected Class Boundaries and Asymmetric Effects of  
Res Judicata 
The boundary of potentially affected nonparties influences whether a 
broad remedy is appropriate absent a class action suit. There are two main 
reasons for this. First, if the affected class of nonparties is very small and 
cohesive, an injunction reaching nonparties clearly falls within a court’s 
equitable powers because it approximates the English concept of a “bill of 
peace.”151 Even Professor Bray acknowledges that this may be an appropriate 
use of the judicial power.152 
Second, allowing for a single class member to win an injunction that 
affects a large class puts defendants at a systematic disadvantage.153 In a class 
action, defendants benefit from res judicata against all members of the class 
if they win, but face an equally large liability toward each member of the 
class if they lose. Hence, with a class action, the risks and rewards are equally 
great for both sides. In contrast, if a single plaintiff can win class-wide relief, 
the defendant’s liability approximates that of a class action lawsuit. If the 
defendant wins, however, the res judicata effect of that decision affects only 
one plaintiff, leaving an almost infinite number of other plaintiffs to bring 
the same lawsuit.154 
 
 149 See id. at 1409. 
 150 See id. (“Moreover, if persons adversely affected by an agency rule can seek review in the district 
court for the District of Columbia, as they often may, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), our refusal to sustain a 
broad injunction is likely merely to generate a flood of duplicative litigation. Even though our jurisdiction 
is not exclusive, an injunction issued here only as to the plaintiff organizations and their members would 
cause all others affected by the Tulloch Rule . . . to file separate actions for declaratory relief in this 
circuit.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 151 A bill of peace was a type of “proto-class action” which allowed the chancellor to consolidate a 
small, cohesive group of duplicative suits into a single proceeding. See Bray, supra note 7, at 427. 
 152 See id. at 427 (justifying the use of equity in the nineteenth century to enjoin collection of illegal 
municipal taxes on the basis that the relevant classes were small, representing the type of “micropolity” 
characteristic of a bill of peace). 
 153 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1149–51. 
 154 See id. at 1150. 
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9. Miscellaneous Factors 
In addition to the eight factors discussed above, there are five other 
factors that are relevant to determining the proper scope of equitable relief: 
uniformity,155 plaintiff detection,156 egalitarian concerns,157 forum 
shopping,158 comity concerns surrounding conflicting injunctions,159 and 
percolation.160 
In sum, no fewer than thirteen factors are relevant when determining 
the proper scope of an injunction. This Note proposes consolidating these 
factors into three meta-factors that judges can more uniformly and 
effectively apply in cases involving nationwide injunctions. 
B. Simplifying Balancing Through a “Triangulation” of  
Equitable Remedies 
This Note’s first contribution is a new framework for categorizing and 
evaluating the factors that affect nationwide injunctions. While all thirteen 
factors discussed above are deserving of individual consideration, an 
analysis of the key characteristics of each factor reveals three overarching 
categories of factors: (1) the identity of the parties before the court; (2) the 
nature of the claim being litigated; and (3) the effect of the remedy on the 
judicial system where the claim is being litigated. These three factors can be 
thought of as asking “who,” “what,” and “where,” respectively. 
The first category, the “who,” concerns the nature of the parties before 
the court. This category includes six subfactors: (a) the type of party involved 
(state, federal, and private parties); (b) federalism and abstention issues 
associated with state defendants; (c) the precedent of Mendoza and 
intercircuit agency nonacquiescence; (d) the type of agency being sued 
(including whether it is a law enforcement agency); (e) the presence of a 
certified class (or conversely, the size of the nonparty beneficiaries); and (f) 
plaintiff-detection issues. 
The second category, the “what,” concerns the nature of the claim being 
litigated. This category includes three subfactors: (a) the substantive area of 
law/scope of the injury; (b) facial versus as-applied challenges; and (c) the 
type of injunction sought (mandatory versus prohibitory and preliminary 
versus permanent). 
 
 155 See supra Section I.A. 
 156 See supra text accompanying notes 90–94. 
 157 See supra Section I.A. 
 158 See supra Section I.B. 
 159 See supra Section I.B. 
 160 See supra Section I.B. 
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The third category, the “where,” looks at the court deciding the case and 
the effects on the court system as a whole. This category includes six 
subfactors: (a) boundaries of the class and asymmetric effects of res judicata; 
(b) conservation of judicial resources and venue considerations; (c) 
uniformity in application of the law; (d) comity and conflicting injunctions; 
(e) forum shopping; and (f) percolation. 
This framework demonstrates how certain factors interrelate, and in 
doing so, simplifies the inquiry, making a balancing test more manageable. 
Not every subfactor will be relevant in each case—for instance, federalism 
or abstention issues are only applicable where a state is a party. Each meta-
factor, however, will always be relevant to the inquiry. The next Part argues 
that these three meta-factors can and should be used in a multifactor 
balancing test in order to determine whether a nationwide injunction is 
appropriate in a given circumstance. 
IV. “HOT AND COLD”: EASY AND DIFFICULT CASES FOR EQUITABLE 
BALANCING AND A PATH FORWARD 
In order to determine when a nationwide injunction is appropriate, 
courts should analyze the three meta-factors described in the previous Part 
as a multifactor balancing test. This Part first discusses how judges should 
apply the balancing test to both easy and hard cases, and then explores how 
this balancing test would apply in practice by examining a test case: the 
litigation surrounding President Trump’s travel ban. 
A. Applying the Balancing Test to “Hot,” “Cold,” and “Warm” Cases 
One general objection to use of a balancing test is that it renders district 
court opinions effectively unreviewable, because a balancing test leaves too 
much discretion in the hands of judges. Professor Bray argues that this is a 
fundamental flaw of using a standard rather than a rule.161 However, this 
danger is overstated. At the very least, this Note argues that there are two 
categories of “easy” cases, or cases in which the propriety of injunctions that 
reach beyond named plaintiffs is clear. Some cases are “hot,” where all three 
meta-factors point toward issuing a broad injunction. Other cases are “cold,” 
where all three meta-factors point against issuing a broad injunction, and 
doing so would be an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The difficult, or 
“warm,” cases are those in which the factors are split.162 
 
 161 See Bray, supra note 7, at 480 (“[A] district court selected through forum shopping will apply a 
relatively indeterminate standard, which will then be leniently reviewed by a court of appeals . . . .”). 
 162 It is no answer to say that the factors will always point at least 2–1 in one direction, because each 
factor will vary in importance based on the circumstances. For example, in applying a multifactor 
balancing test for compulsory joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), courts have come to 
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A flexible standard utilizing a multifactor balancing test affords a way 
to curb the greatest errors in “hot” and “cold” cases without prohibiting 
injunctions from ever reaching nonparties. Even in those “warm” cases, 
where the categories are split, applying a balancing test still affords a benefit 
over the status quo because it prompts judges to justify their reasoning. At 
minimum, this creates an opportunity for increased dialogue among courts 
about the proper scope of injunctive relief, which is the ordinary conception 
of how the common law works.163 Legal rules are made to apply to real 
circumstances, and by testing out different approaches, courts are able to 
develop more nuanced rules that solve difficult cases. Injunctions should be 
no exception. 
B. Applying the Multifactor Balancing Test 
While many nationwide injunctions have been controversial, none 
received as much attention as Executive Order 13,769164 and its successor, 
Executive Order 13,780,165 popularly referred to as the “travel bans” or 
“Muslim bans.”166 This Note applies the three-factor balancing test to the 
litigation surrounding President Trump’s travel ban.167 In doing so, this Note 
argues that the travel ban was a “cold” case, in which all three meta-factors 
counseled against an injunction. 
1. “Who”—the Identity and Nature of the Parties Before the Court 
The first category, the identity and nature of the parties before the court, 
counsels against issuing a nationwide injunction. The federal government—
more specifically the Department of Homeland Security, the Secretary of 
 
a consensus that one factor—the availability of another forum for the plaintiff to assert their claim—is 
more important than the other two. See infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 163 There are many different justifications and accounts for the common law method. See generally 
R. L. Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law Method, 57 B.U. L. 
REV. 807 (1977) (discussing the value of justiciability requirements in preserving a common law method 
of legal interpretation). 
 164 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No. 
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 165 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No. 
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 166 See Melanie Zanona, Timeline: Trump Travel Ban’s Road to the Supreme Court, THE HILL (Sept. 
17, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/350932-timeline-trump-travel-bans-
road-to-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/HS9Y-M2ZQ]. 
 167 While litigation surrounding the first and second Executive Orders differed with respect to 
liability, the two were essentially identical from a remedies perspective and will therefore be analyzed 
together. See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) 
(enjoining portions of the travel ban), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017) (issuing a nationwide injunction against the 
president’s revised travel ban); Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017) (enjoining other 
parts of the revised travel ban). 
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State, and the President—was the defendant in this case.168 The relevant 
subfactors here include: the type of agency being sued, the value of 
percolation amongst the courts, and the breadth of the affected class.169 First, 
the presumption that broad injunctions against law enforcement agencies 
should be avoided counsels against a nationwide injunction.170 The severe 
consequences of enjoining the President are analogous to the dangers of 
enjoining a law enforcement agency, because the President must oversee 
enforcement of the laws under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.171 
Enjoining a president directly is arguably even more dangerous than 
enjoining a law enforcement agency—indeed, both the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits, while keeping the rest of the injunctions intact, reversed the district 
courts’ injunctions against the President for precisely this reason.172 
Moreover, the Department of Homeland Security and State Department (led 
by the Secretary of State) are also law enforcement agencies. Therefore, this 
subfactor weighs against issuing an injunction. 
The last relevant subfactor—the breadth of the affected class173—also 
weighs strongly against issuing an injunction. While it is difficult to say how 
many people the first or second travel bans would have affected, the revised 
travel ban limited the number of refugees per year to 50,000, half the number 
President Obama had planned to admit.174 Therefore, the number of 
unnamed, affected plaintiffs would be in the tens of thousands, which means 
that a nationwide injunction affects many more plaintiffs than “bills of 
peace” ever did, putting defendants at a systematic disadvantage.175 Putting 
the pieces together, each of these three relevant subfactors counsels against 
issuing an injunction, and thus the broader “who” meta-factor ultimately 
counsels against issuing a nationwide injunction. 
 
 168 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 169 Other subfactors in this category include: federalism and abstention issues associated with state 
defendants, Mendoza precedent and intercircuit agency nonacquiescence, the presence of a certified class, 
and plaintiff-detection issues. See supra Section III.A. 
 170 See supra Section III.A.3. 
 171 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”). 
 172 See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 788 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir. 2017) (“We recognize that ‘in general, this court has no jurisdiction 
of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties . . . .’” (quoting Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802–03 (1992))). 
 173 See supra Section III.A.8. 
 174 See Alexander Burns, 2 Federal Judges Rule Against Trump’s Latest Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html 
[https://perma.cc/X4VS-CLLA] (“[The travel ban] would have also . . . limited refugee admissions to 
50,000 people in the current fiscal year. Mr. Obama had set in motion plans to admit more than twice that 
number.”). 
 175 See supra Section III.A.8. 
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2. “What”—the Nature of the Claim 
While more balanced (or “warmer”), this category also ultimately 
counsels against issuing an injunction in this case. Relevant subfactors here 
include: the substantive area of law, the fact that the challenge was a facial 
challenge, and the type of injunction being sought. First, the substantive area 
of law at issue—immigration law—does not have the same spill-over effects 
associated with, for example, a free speech claim. The Fourth Circuit argued 
that because the challenge involved an Establishment Clause violation, 
language in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe176 indicated that a 
broad injunction was justified.177 This language stated that allowing a 
discriminatory policy to be enforced against some, but not all, citizens would 
send a message that the plaintiffs were “outsiders” and “not full members of 
the political community.”178 
Yet the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on Santa Fe seems misplaced, as the 
language cited concerned liability, not the appropriate scope of the remedy. 
More importantly, in the travel ban cases, it is possible to distinguish 
between the injury felt by each individual plaintiff seeking entry to the 
United States, because one plaintiff could be let in while another is not. In 
contrast, the issue of allowing prayer in school (the issue in question in Santa 
Fe) is an example of “indivisible relief”179 as prayer would either be allowed 
or not allowed at football games. The nature of the claim at issue in Santa Fe 
therefore had to be litigated all at once to avoid conflicting judgments. 
Because the travel ban cases did not involve indivisible relief, this subfactor 
counsels against issuing an injunction. The fact that the challenge is a facial 
challenge, however, cuts in the other direction. The type of injunction sought 
is also prohibitory (not allowing Executive Order 13,780 to take effect), 
which is less onerous than a mandatory injunction. 
On balance, this meta-factor counsels against issuing an injunction, 
because if the mere fact that a challenge is facial and prohibitorywhich 
characterizes many constitutional suits against enforcing a lawwere 
sufficient to justify an injunction, then injunctions would nearly always 
issue. The type of injury involved in suits challenging enforcement of a law 
is therefore a subfactor that should be accorded less weight than the other 
“what” subfactors. With respect to the “what” factor, then, the injury 
 
 176 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (holding that policy of allowing students to initiate prayer at football 
games violated the First Amendment). 
 177 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 605. 
 178 See id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 309 (considering 
whether student-led prayer at football games was constitutional)). 
 179 For a discussion of indivisible relief, see supra Section III.A.4. 
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involved in the travel ban does not justify a broad injunction because it is not 
associated with the type of inseverable harm present in other areas of the law. 
3. “Where”—the Effect on the Court System 
The third and final category likewise counsels against a nationwide 
injunction in this context. Relevant subfactors here include: the boundaries 
of the affected class and the asymmetric effects of res judicata; conservation 
of judicial resources and venue considerations; uniformity in application of 
the law; forum shopping; and percolation.180 
First, the boundaries of the class size were very large, so the asymmetric 
effects of res judicata against the government were correspondingly large. 
Only one affected immigrant had to prevail for every class member to 
benefit, while the government had to win every case. Next, regarding judicial 
resources and venue considerations, there does not appear to be a court 
crowding issue like in National Mining Association,181 because none of the 
travel ban cases had to be filed in a specific circuit. Third, forum shopping 
was also certainly a potential problem in this case, because those opposing 
the Executive Order could focus their efforts on cases in ideologically 
friendly districts.182 Fourth, the preliminary injunction also prevented 
percolation among the courts as it always does,183 and this effect was 
pronounced because the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on a similar legal 
issue.184 While most of the subfactors weigh against a nationwide injunction, 
uniformity in application of the law counsels toward broad relief, which both 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits specifically mention as a justification for their 
decision.185 Lastly, efficiency also counsels toward issuing an injunction, as 
it always does, because it prevents duplicate litigation. 
Ultimately, the direction in which this third meta-factor ought to lean 
depends on the weight a judge puts on each of these subfactors. As discussed 
above, the only subfactors that counsel toward a nationwide injunction are 
 
 180 Another subfactor in this category not discussed is the risk of conflicting injunctions. See supra 
Section I.B. 
 181 See supra text accompanying notes 147–50. 
 182 President Trump even took to Twitter to specifically decry “judge shopping” after the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 26, 2017, 3:38 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/857182179469774848 [https://perma.cc/EP57-XKJA]. 
 183 For a discussion of the importance of percolation, see supra Section I.B. 
 184 However, concerns over shortcutting the “percolation” process were somewhat ameliorated given 
that a district and circuit court had already reviewed Executive Order 13,769, see Washington v. Trump, 
847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. 
Feb. 3, 2017), and two district courts and two courts of appeals had reviewed revised Executive Order 
13,780, see Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 
857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 
2017); Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017). 
 185 See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 787–88; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 605. 
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uniformity and efficiency. However, those factors always counsel toward 
disposing of an issue once and for all, and as Professor Bray eloquently 
argues, Congress’s choice to break up the courts into circuits was itself a 
policy decision that sacrificed uniformity and efficiency in favor of more 
incremental, stable change.186 When uniformity and efficiency are the only 
reasons to issue a broad injunction, a narrower injunction should issue, 
because otherwise nationwide injunctions will always be issued, frustrating 
Congress’s policy decision and violating comity amongst the courts. 
Therefore, this third meta-factor ultimately counsels against issuing an 
injunction in the travel ban cases. 
In sum, the application of this Note’s three-factor balancing test finds 
that a nationwide injunction was not proper in the travel ban cases because 
all three meta-factors point against broad relief, and the only two subfactors 
weighing toward a nationwide injunction—uniformity and efficiency—
always counsel toward broad relief. This case therefore presents one of the 
clearest possible examples of where an injunction should not issue. 
V. WHY A BALANCING TEST WILL BE WORKABLE IN PRACTICE 
While the three-factor balancing test discussed above may sometimes 
allow courts of appeals to conclude the district courts abused their discretion 
in issuing a nationwide injunction, there are at least two counterarguments 
to the use of multifactor balancing tests: First, balancing tests are unworkable 
in practice and fail to give parties adequate notice as to what the law is; and 
second, they violate separation of powers by reevaluating policy choices 
made by Congress (or by “the people” in the case of constitutional claims). 
In analyzing these counterarguments, this Part concludes that over time, the 
common law method will cause courts to come to a greater consensus as to 
which factors are most important, just as they have with the necessary parties 
doctrine. Next, this Part argues that even if one concedes the objection to the 
use of balancing tests for determining liability, balancing tests are proper for 
determining remedies. 
A. The Necessary Parties Balancing Test and the Common Law Method 
Many scholars and judges have decried balancing tests as unworkable 
and as undermining the rule of law. Notably, Justice Scalia often opposed 
balancing tests in the law, because he viewed “The Rule of Law as a Law of 
 
 186 See Bray, supra note 7, at 481–82. As Professor Bray argued, “[e]ach legal system can pick its 
poison, tending toward the vices of immediate, final resolution or the vices of slow, provisional 
resolution.” Id. at 482. 
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Rules”187 and not of standards.188 This core objection to the use of balancing 
tests is that, because they afford judges substantial discretion, the tests are 
unworkable, and their results are simply a function of a judge’s intuitions 
and personal policy preferences. Those who defend a balancing test tend to 
argue that a rule may prove undesirable in some instances,189 and the 
common law method will adequately allow judges to eventually reach a 
workable rule. This is an empirical question that demands specific examples 
to see if balancing tests are successful in practice, a question that is outside 
the scope of this Note. Balancing tests are used in a variety of contexts, 
including the Fourth Amendment,190 procedural due process,191 “dormant” 
Commerce Clause cases,192 the First Amendment,193 and the decision to issue 
a permanent injunction.194 To illustrate, consider one example of a balancing 
test in further detail: the compulsory joinder of parties under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 19(b).195 
 
 187 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
 188 For a discussion on the difference between rules and standards, see generally Pierre Schlag, Rules 
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379 (1985). 
 189 See id. (discussing a dispute between Justice Benjamin Cardozo and Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes in which Justice Holmes endorses a rule while Justice Cardozo endorses a standard). 
 190 See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118 (1986) (reasonableness of a search); United States 
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983) (definition of a search). 
 191 See Scalia, supra note 187, at 1182 (“[A]t the point where an appellate judge says that the 
remaining issue must be decided . . . by a balancing of all the factors involved, he begins to resemble a 
finder of fact more than a determiner of law.”); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in 
the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 965–66 (1987) (listing areas where the Supreme Court uses 
balancing tests). 
 192 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits.”). 
 193 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380–81 (1984) (“Making that judgment 
requires a critical examination of the interests of the public and broadcasters in light of the particular 
circumstances of each case.”). Balancing tests are perhaps most controversial with respect to the First 
Amendment and have a long history of use in that context. See Aleinikoff, supra note 191, at 966–68 
(summarizing the history of balancing tests in the First Amendment context); see also Martin H. Redish, 
Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 
70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1186–87 (1982) (endorsing a balancing test for the First Amendment, stating 
that “[b]ecause . . . an inflexible test cannot allow a court to fit its rule to the unique circumstances of a 
case, it is likely to become a procrustean bed that will often prove to be either overprotective or 
underprotective in individual instances”). 
 194 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (adopting a four-factor test 
for issuing a permanent injunction). 
 195 Rule 19(a) describes “required” parties who must be joined if feasible, while Rule 19(b) lays out 
four factors that courts must balance to determine if the claim should be permitted to proceed without a 
Rule 19(a) party. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
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Compulsory joinder began as an equitable doctrine created to address 
the inefficiency of multiple litigation.196 There is substantial similarity 
between the balancing test courts use to determine whether someone is a 
necessary party under Rule 19 and the balancing test this Note endorses.197 
Both tests focus on the parties to the case, the nature of their claims (under 
the Rule 19 test, the prejudicial effect of a judgment given the type of rights 
that are affected), and concerns for judicial economy. Given time, there is 
reason to believe that the common law method will work as well for 
injunctions as it has for compulsory joinder, provided that judges explain 
their reasoning as balancing tests require.198 
As is true with equitable doctrines in general, the rule against 
proceeding without interested parties is not an inflexible rule but is one that 
gives courts discretion to apply the law sensitively to the facts of each case.199 
After the influential case Shields v. Barrow,200 the doctrine became mired in 
the sometimes-hazy distinction between “common” and “joint” rights, which 
Professors Charles Wright and Mary Kane decried as a “jurisprudence of 
labels.”201 Congress rejected Shields’s formalistic approach and instead 
adopted a four-factor test.202 The four factors the Court now applies to 
determine if joinder of parties is “indispensable” are: (1) the plaintiff’s 
interest in having a forum, (2) the defendant’s interest, (3) the interest of the 
 
 196 See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 120 (1968) (discussing 
how compulsory joinder was created in equity to address “the inefficiency of litigation involving only 
some of the interested persons”). 
 197 The similarity is closest with the three-factor test recommended by Professor John Reed, whose 
1957 law review article was influential in the 1966 amendment to Rule 19. See John W. Reed, 
Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 330 (1957) (laying out his test 
that balances: (1) the interest of the present defendant, (2) the interest of the absent plaintiff(s) or 
defendant(s), and (3) the courts’ interest in the efficient resolution of litigation). 
 198 See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 199 See Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 166–67 (1825) (“This equitable rule, however, 
is framed by the Court itself, and is subject to its discretion. It is not . . . an inflexible rule . . . but, being 
introduced by the Court itself, for the purposes of justice, is susceptible of modification for the promotion 
of those purposes.”). 
 200 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854). 
 201 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 70, at 498 (6th ed. 
2002). 
 202 As it was passed in 1966, Rule 19 stated, in relevant part:  
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the 
person’s absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, 
by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice 
can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be 
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (1966) (amended 2007). For reasons not important here, the factors laid out by the 
Court in Provident Tradesmens differ somewhat from the factors listed in Rule 19. 
113:331 (2018) Who, What, and Where 
367 
absent party, and (4) the interest of the courts and the public in the complete 
and efficient resolution of litigation.203 As with any balancing test, the Court 
noted that conflict between the factors will often occur.204 
In applying this test, courts have frequently found that in a given case 
all relevant factors point toward205 or against206 dismissing for nonjoinder of 
an indispensable party. These are analogous to the “hot” and “cold” cases 
previously discussed in this Note. In the close, or “warm,” cases where a 
conflict in the factors exists, some courts have proceeded despite prejudice 
to the absent party in so proceeding,207 while others have dismissed despite 
some factors counseling toward allowing the claim to proceed.208 But while 
Provident Tradesmens remains the only major Supreme Court case 
interpreting Rule 19(b), lower courts have come to a consensus on the 
primary importance of the plaintiff’s interest in having a forum, allowing 
cases where a plaintiff would have no other forum to proceed despite the 
other three factors pointing toward dismissal.209 Therefore, while not perfect, 
Rule 19(b)’s multifactor balancing test appears to be a functioning and 
generally coherent body of law that has “worked itself pure”210 since 1966. 
Over time, provided that courts fully explain their choice of remedy, they 
should come to a consensus as to which factors matter most. 
 
 203 Provident Tradesmens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109–12 (1968). This four-
factor test was influenced by Professor Reed’s three-factor test. See supra note 197. 
 204 See Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 118–19 (“The decision whether to dismiss (i.e., the 
decision whether the person missing is ‘indispensable’) must be based on factors varying with the 
different cases, some such factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, 
and some subject to balancing against opposing interests.” (second emphasis added)). 
 205 See, e.g., B. Fernández & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 516 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[A]ll 
four 19(b) factors still militate in favor of finding Kellogg Caribbean indispensable . . . .”). 
 206 See, e.g., Trans Energy, Inc. v. EQT Prod. Co., 743 F.3d 895, 902 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e are 
satisfied that there is no reason to believe that any party will be harmed by REV’s absence, or that the 
plaintiffs received an improper ‘tactical advantage’ by including REV as a party.”). 
 207 See Bennie v. Pastor, 393 F.2d 1, 3–4 (10th Cir. 1968) (allowing case to proceed despite the fact 
that the absence of the defendant’s daughter could prejudice the defendant by subjecting her to multiple 
liability, because other factors counseled against a finding of indispensability). 
 208 See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Rule 
19(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as Amended in 1966, Providing for Determination to be Made 
by Court to Proceed With or Dismiss Action When Joinder of Person Needed for Just Adjudication is Not 
Feasible, 21 A.L.R. Fed. 12, § 8 (1974) (citing McKenna v. Udall, 418 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1969), as an 
example of a case dismissing for nonjoinder despite the fact that some factors counseled toward allowing 
the case to proceed). 
 209 See generally Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure 
Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (1985) (“Though this is but one factor in a multifactor 
balancing test, federal courts have elevated it to primary importance by their reluctance to dismiss in the 
absence of an adequate alternative forum.” (footnote omitted)). 
 210 Omychund v. Barker (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch.) (“[T]he common law . . . works itself pure 
by rules drawn from the fountain of justice.”). 
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B. The Rules vs. Standards Debate in the Equity Context 
The second major objection to balancing tests is that they effectively 
allow the judiciary to eliminate an individual’s rights—be they 
constitutional, common law, or statutory in nature—in the name of 
“balancing.” Justice Hugo Black was most closely aligned with this 
argument. He objected to the emerging use of balancing tests for 
constitutional rights because “the Framers themselves did this balancing 
when they wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.”211 To balance 
interests in determining the scope of a constitutional right, therefore, was to 
usurp the Article V amendment process and second-guess the democratic 
will of those who ratified the constitutional provision in question. 
Even for an absolutist like Justice Black, the use of balancing tests is 
less problematic when used to determine remedies than when used to 
determine rights (or violations). Indeed, even Justice Black used the 
balancing of the equities test for equitable remedies.212 Equitable balancing 
in the remedies context does not change the contours of a constitutional right. 
Balancing tests, like the one this Note endorses, would not allow a judge to 
enjoin a policy for purely utilitarian reasons but would instead first require a 
finding of unconstitutionality. Balancing tests in the remedies context are not 
triggered unless a determination has been made that a violation, 
constitutional or otherwise, has taken place, in which case the court can 
decide how it should use its equitable powers. Therefore, one may concede 
the general truth of the objection to balancing tests while still adopting the 
test this Note recommends.213 
CONCLUSION 
The use of the nationwide injunction has gained substantial notoriety, 
and cases like President Trump’s travel ban will continue to present 
themselves. In an effort to protect similarly situated nonparties from harm, 
courts have sometimes gone too far by issuing nationwide injunctions in 
situations that do not warrant such an extreme remedy. While the courts have 
always had substantial discretion in fashioning equitable relief, the 
 
 211 Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 879 (1960). 
 212 See, e.g., Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165 (1946) (Justice 
Black, writing for the Court, endorsing a balance of the equities test between creditors and debtors in a 
bankruptcy proceeding); United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940) 
(opinion of Justice Black holding that balancing of equities did not apply, but implicitly assuming its legal 
validity elsewhere). 
 213 Balancing tests in matters of procedure, like in Rule 19(b) for compulsory joinder of parties, may 
also be less troubling from this perspective because they only affect how and where rights are adjudicated, 
not the substance of the rights themselves. 
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widespread use of broad injunctions can cause great harm to the federal 
government and the judicial system as a whole. A complete elimination of 
this remedy is likewise problematic because it is inconsistent with the history 
of equity and runs counter to precedent. 
Hope for the future lies in a return to the past, namely the time-tested 
method of equitable balancing. While there are dozens of potentially relevant 
factors in this balancing, all of them boil down to three metafactors: the type 
of parties before the court, the nature of the claim involved, and the effect 
the remedy would have on the court system as a whole. If all three of these 
factors point against issuing an injunction, it is abuse of discretion for a court 
to do so. Even in the difficult cases where the factors are split, the common 
law method will facilitate invention of more nuanced standards and rules, 
provided that judges explain their reasoning. While the system of remedies 
may seem to be in chaos right now, equity has always innovated to 
compensate for new problems. A three-factor balancing test will help to 
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